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Abstract 
This study analyzes how fertilizer subsidies to maize production in Malawi affects farm 
households‟ crop choice, cropland allocation and crop diversification level. The analysis is 
based on a three-year household survey data collected in 2006, 2007 and 2009 from six 
districts across Malawi; two of the districts are in the central region while four districts are in 
the southern region. Crop choice and cropland allocation patterns are examined using the 
generalized least square (GLS) model within which the control function approach is applied to 
control for endogeneity arising from having access to fertilizer subsidy. In this study, the 
access to fertilizer is used as a binary endogenous regressor in the crop choice/cropland 
allocation and crop diversification equations. The Simpson‟s index of crop diversification is 
used as the dependent variable in the assessment of the relationship between farm households‟ 
access to fertilizer subsidy and crop diversification level. This relationship is analyzed using 
the treatment effect model in order to overcome the endogeneity problem. Model estimations 
are based on pooled panel data. Empirical results indicate that farm households‟ cropland 
allocation patterns and the subsequent crop diversification levels are sensitive to fertilizer 
subsidy program. In particular, the results showed that farm households‟ access to fertilizer 
subsidy is associated with a decrease in the cropland allocation to maize and pulses while 
there is an increase in cropland allocation to ground nuts, roots-tubers and tobacco. In terms of 
crop diversification, the study findings suggest that farm households‟ access to fertilizer 
subsidies promote crop diversification. The results illustrate that fertilizer subsidies to maize 
positively contribute to promoting farm households‟ crop diversification levels through 
intensified maize production. This has implications for household welfare; crop diversification 
enhances stability of household incomes through the mitigation of price and crop production 
risks and shocks. 
 Key words: fertilizer subsidy, cropland allocation, crop diversification, Malawi 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 Introduction 
Fertilizer subsidy programs are again
1
 taking stage in many African countries mainly to 
challenge the food shortage problems arising from declining soil productivity, erratic weather 
and high population growth (Minot and Benson, 2009). Malawi is one of such countries that 
have possibly drawn a global attention for successfully implementing its innovative input 
subsidy program for the past four consecutive crop growing seasons. The program is 
particularly hailed for the resulting surplus staple food crop production levels, some of which 
has been exported to neighboring countries (Denning et al., 2009).  
Literature indicates that agricultural support programs such as fertilizer subsidies that are 
directly linked to farmers‟ production of specific crops, not only affect total production, land 
use, labour use and other inputs‟ use, but also distort the mix of crops grown (Westcott and 
Young, 2004). Farmers that benefit from such program support tend to switch to crops with 
higher benefit resulting from the received program support, especially when there is no room 
to expand their total planted area (Di Falco and Perrings, 2005; Vavra and Colman, 2003). 
This illustrates that at both policy and farm household level, the composition and the level of 
crop production are of crucial concern (Ali, 1990). Therefore studies on the impact of 
subsidies on crop production must reflect not only crop productivity changes but also farmers‟ 
crop switching behaviors as these may have implications for crop yield and production levels, 
crop market supply response, crop diversification, food security and poverty.  
Agricultural subsidies play an important role in farm households‟ crop production strategies 
by relaxing some of the production constraints, risks and market imperfections or failures 
(Chavas and Holt, 1990; Duffy et al., 1994). Financial assistance to farm households in the 
form of subsidies directly affects their production decisions mainly through inputs, cropland 
and labor resource allocation (Di Falco and Perrings, 2005; Westcott and Young, 2004). 
                                                          
1
 Fertilizer subsidies were a common and major element in the agricultural development policy strategies in the  
1960‟s-70‟s but were phased out in the 1980‟s-90‟s as part of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). 
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However, past studies on the impact of fertilizer subsidy programs in Malawi have not been 
extended to analyzing farm households‟ behavior response in terms of crop choice and 
cropland allocation decisions. This response behavior can vary across regions, reflecting 
differences in agro-ecological zones, resource constraints and the functioning of markets. 
Empirical findings also indicate that there are gender differentials in farm productivities 
which can also be accounted for in terms of farmers cropping pattern responses to the 
fertilizer subsidy support (Smale and Heisey, 1994; Udry et al., 1995). 
 
This study is motivated by two opposing theoretical arguments regarding how farm 
households‟ cropping patterns respond to fertilizer subsidies. On one hand, it is argued that 
crop specific subsidies provide farm households‟ an incentive to grow the most supported 
crop (s) which lead to a reduction in crop diversification. In order to manage the risk and 
ensure profitability, farmers increase cropland allocation to the subsidized crop (s) and reduce 
the cropland allocated to the substitute crops (Di Falco and Perrings, 2005; Chavas and Holt, 
1990; Westcott and Young, 2004; Ellis, 1992). Thus, this leads to specialisation in the 
supported crop (s) instead of crop diversification.  On the other hand, fertilizer subsidies 
might promote cropland intensification of the supported crops. Through higher yields, the 
same amount of produce can be obtained from a smaller area. This outcome enables farm 
households to re-allocate the uncultivated cropland to other crops thereby promoting crop 
diversification (Smale, 1995). 
 
This dilemma therefore necessitates a deeper understanding of farmers‟ crop switching 
behavior which is not only important for policy planning, but also for those interested in 
evaluating input subsidy programs. This is because crop switching patterns account for spatial 
and inter-temporal variations in crop yields and revenue. This in turn, has implications for 
household food security and welfare (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelson, 2008; Nkonya et al., 
2004).  Hence, effective measurement of the impact of the agricultural input subsidy programs 
on crop yields, production levels, supply response, food security and poverty reduction 
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requires critical understanding of farm households‟ decision on crop choices and cropland 
allocation and crop diversification (Guyomard et al., 1996; Mendola, 2007). 
 
This study therefore seeks to provide an empirical analysis of the role of fertilizer subsidies on 
farm households‟ cropping decisions including crop diversification. The main objective of the 
study is to investigate the role of the fertilizer subsidy program on farm households‟ crop 
choice, cropland allocation and crop diversification. Specifically, the study aims to 1) assess 
how fertilizer subsidies to maize affect crop diversification at farm household level; 2) 
investigate how fertilizer subsidies to maize affect cropland allocation to other major crops 
such ground nuts, tobacco and root-tuber crops; 3) assess gender and regional differences in 
crop diversification with respect to farm households‟ participation in the fertilizer subsidy 
program. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: chapter two provides the background sections 
followed by chapter three which outlines the theoretical framework and literature review. 
Chapter four provides the study methodology followed by chapters five and six which discuss 
the empirical results and conclusions respectively. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 Background 
2.1 Malawi’s smallholder context of crop production  
Malawi‟s path to economic growth and development follows a strategy of smallholder-led 
agricultural development. Approximately 90 percent of all households derive their livelihoods 
from farming. Therefore improvements in smallholder productivity imply increased 
agricultural development.  The agriculture system has a bi-modal structure comprising 
smallholder farmers and large scale estate holders and it heavily depends on rain-fed 
agriculture. The smallholder sector contributes 75 percent of the total agricultural production 
while estates account for the remaining 25 percent. However, the smallholder agriculture is 
characterized by maize-dominated production systems with low productivity and stagnant yields. 
Increasing productivity and diversifying into high-value crops have been identified to be the key 
steps to improving the performance of smallholder agriculture in Malawi (Malawi Government 
and World Bank, 2006). 
 
Smallholders in Malawi can be classified as semi-commercial peasant farmers that grow crops 
largely for home consumption (Smale, 1995). Usually farmers sell their maize at low prices 
during harvest time. However, they fail to buy it when they need it later in the season mainly 
because the market cannot provide or the price becomes unaffordable. The large scale estates 
focus on the growing of high value cash crops for export including tobacco, tea, sugar, coffee 
and macademia nuts (Orr and Orr, 2002). Table 1 shows percentage of smallholder farm 
households cultivating different crops at national and regional levels. 
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Table 1: Percentage of farm households cultivating different crops 
Crops grown National Central region Southern region 
Maize 97 97 99 
Other cereals 24 14 33 
Roots/tubers 36 35 32 
Cassava 21 11 24 
Pulses 68 70 69 
Ground nuts 38 53 25 
Beans 23 34 13 
Pigeon peas 27 3 54 
Tobacco 15 25 6 
Vegetables 36 40 33 
Source: Malawi Government and World Bank (2006) 
 
Maize is the staple food, it is grown by 97 percent of farm households and it takes about 90 
percent of the cropped area. The need to secure household food requirements limit farm 
households‟ efforts to diversify into high value cash crops and/or other micro enterprises. In 
addition, most farm households put their priority in the production for subsistence food needs 
which reflects lack of confidence in the rural markets because they are either missing or 
imperfect Malawi Government and World Bank (2006).  
 
Other major staple foods
2
 include roots and tubers comprising mainly cassava (21 percent of 
farm households) and sweet potato. FAO (2004) indicates that cassava is becoming the second 
most important alternative staple. Other minor cereals include sorghum, millet and rice. 
Vegetables and pulses
3
 are also main food crops. Tobacco (mainly burley tobacco), is the 
                                                          
2 Cassava, sorghum and potatoes act as bridging crops in times of shortages in maize production and supply. Cassava acreage 
and production are reported to be increasing since late 1990s (FAO, 2004) 
3 These crops mainly include pigeon peas, beans and ground nuts. 
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male dominated crop
4
, the country‟s main cash crop accounting for 30 percent of GDP and 70 
percent of exports earnings. Tobacco is a competitor crop with maize for labor and land 
resources and it requires crop rotation to prevent plant insect pests and disease infestation 
and/or build up (Orr, 2000).  
 
There are important boundaries between male and females within the household, in terms of 
who makes crop cultivation decisions. Women mainly grow crops for home consumption 
while men cultivate at least some cash crops in addition. In terms of decision making on crop 
production activities, women hold decision making power in female-headed households only. 
In male headed households, men make almost all decisions especially for the cultivation of 
cash crops and vegetables. Women‟s role in this case is largely limited to crops that do not 
require fertilizers and purchased seed (Malawi Government and World Bank, 2006). 
 
Access to farm inputs, especially fertilizer has been identified as the most constraining factor 
for improving smallholder productivity. To overcome this challenge, the government decided 
to implement fertilizer subsidy targeting poor smallholder farmers. Since the implementation 
of the fertilizer subsidy program started over the past four years, Malawi has made remarkably 
positive shifts in the performance of smallholder agriculture particularly in the maize sector. 
The sector has registered substantial improvement in maize production
5
, attributable to the 
success of agricultural input subsidy program initiated in 2005/2006 crop growing season 
which coincided with good rains (Denning et al., 2009).  
 
However, the dominance of maize in the cropping pattern still remains the major concern for 
agricultural policy in Malawi as it implies lack of diversification. This situation does not only 
narrow the economic base of farm households but it renders the whole agriculture sector 
                                                          
4
  19 percent of male headed households grow tobacco while only 7 percent of female headed household grow it (Malawi 
Government and World Bank, 2006). 
5 According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security crop estimates, maize production was 2.7 million metric tonnes 
in 2006, 3.4 million tonnes in 2007, 2.9 million metric tonnes in 2008 and 3.9 million metric tonnes in 2009. 
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vulnerable to economic and weather shocks which have become very recurrent. Crop 
diversification is therefore viewed as a key priority in achieving growth in the sector (Malawi 
Government, 2006b). This is evidenced from the following quote from the national food 
security policy: “Government shall put in place distinctly targeted agricultural input subsidies 
to enhance growth and food diversification for the poor farmers that can still not afford 
agriculture inputs after exhausting all economic levers” (ibid). Chirwa (2009) argues that 
unacceptably large numbers of the poor will continue to be exposed to hunger or worse, 
unless farmers have access to improved inputs for both food production and diversification.  
 
Figure 1 presents a national trend on cropland percentage changes between 2004 and 2009; 
possibly suggesting that the incentives offered by the agricultural programs influence farm 
households behavioral responses.  
 
Source: Own computation from Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security crop estimates figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of annual crop area percentage change for major crops from 2004 to 
2009 
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Considering 2004-2005 as the baseline year, figure 1 illustrates that there is no consistent 
pattern in cropland changes. However, in overall terms (2004-2009) tobacco is registering the 
highest cropland change with a total increase of 28 percent, while maize has the lowest 
percentage increase, followed by ground nuts. Cassava (23 percent) and sweet potato (27 
percent) area changes may suggest that these two crops are competing for cropland with 
tobacco.  
In 2005/2006, the year when the fertilizer subsidy program was initiated, there was a small 
increase in cropland allocated to maize (7 percent), cassava (6 percent) and sweet potato (3 
percent); but a decrease was registered for tobacco (-4 percent)and ground nuts (-1 percent). 
2006/2007 surprisingly registered a negative percentage change in the cropland allocation to 
maize and tobacco, while 2007/2008 has the highest percentage cropland increment for maize 
and tobacco.  
The cropland allocation trend indicate access to fertilizer subsidies in one growing season 
result into a supply shock which may possibly reduce crop production in the following year. 
Therefore, understanding the basis of individual crop-yield performance is essential for 
determining the linkages and trade-offs between input subsidies and crop production. 
However, such relationships may not be fully explained at national level without 
understanding the underlying farmers‟ crop choice and cropland allocation behavior.  
2.2 An overview of the fertilizer subsidy program 
Recently, the role of agricultural input subsidy programs in stimulating economic growth and 
addressing food insecurity and poverty challenges has re-emerged as an important agricultural 
policy debate. The re-emergence of this policy debate partly supports the need to urgently 
respond to the crisis posed by the dramatic increases in world food and fertilizer prices in 
2007 and 2008. Land shortage due to population pressure, declining soil fertility and lack of 
purchasing power to access farm inputs, especially fertilizers, are the main explanations for 
low agricultural productivity. Programs for promoting fertilizer and fertilizer subsidies are 
therefore among the top list of options for government and donors (Minde et al., 2008). 
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The Malawi‟s fertilizer subsidy program has become a model for its successful 
implementation for past four consecutive crop growing seasons. The program was initiated in 
2005/2006 crop growing season following a bad crop harvest in 2004/2005 crop season. The 
main objective of the program is to improve smallholder land and labor productivity, food and 
cash crop production and reducing vulnerability to food insecurity and hunger (Dorward et al., 
2008). The program is being implemented within the green revolution strategy, an approach 
advocated by both African union under the NEPAD‟s Common African Agricultural 
Development Program and the UN‟s African green revolution (Sanchez et al., 2009). The 
program is being implemented through the distribution of vouchers of which the targeted 
beneficiary farm households use to redeem the subsidized input at designated farm input 
retails shops. 
 
The program is aimed at reaching the poor smallholder farmers who would not otherwise be 
able to purchase fertilizer at the commercial price. Allocation of coupons starts at regional 
level, then at district level and finally at an Extension Planning Area (EPA) level. Each 
targeted household is intended to receive two coupons (worth 100 kg of fertilizers), one for 
basal and the other for top dressing at the subsidized rate
6
. In addition, each beneficiary 
household was also allowed to buy hybrid maize seed up to a maximum of 2 kilograms at a 
subsidized price. Table 2 provides details of program package and the scale of 
implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The subsidized rates per 50 kilogram bag of fertilizer were MK950 in 2005/06, MK900 in 2006/07, MK800 in 
2007/08 and MK500 in 2008/09. Farmers paid at least 20 percent of the total cost. 
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Table 2: Program package and scale of implementation 
Year Input Package Targets 
2005/2006  120,000 metric tons  of  maize fertilizer 2 x 50 kg bag  1.2 million  
2006/2007  150,000 metric tons  of  maize fertilizer  2 x 50 kg bag  1.5 million  
 4,000 metric tons  of  maize seed  1 x 2 kg pack    1.5 million 
2007/2008  150,000 metric tons  of  maize fertilizer  2 x 50 kg bag  1.5 million  
 4,000 metric tons  of  maize seed 1 x 2 kg pack  1.5 million  
2008/2009  150,000 metric tons  of  maize fertilizer  2 x 50 kg bag  1.5 million  
 4,000 metric tons  of  maize seed 1 x 2 kg pack  1.5 million  
Source: Mwale (2009) 
The process of targeting households to access the subsidized fertilizers is complex partly 
because the targeting criteria are not explicit enough. Hence it leaves room for manipulation 
by those who administer it. The targeting of beneficiary households is based on a combination 
of poverty/vulnerability and productivity indicator which include: the poorest and most 
vulnerable households such widows, elderly, orphans and disabled; households with access to 
land, households with access to cash and capable of adopting and utilizing technology 
(Dorward et al., 2008). 
 
The prominence of Malawi‟s fertilizer subsidy program has attracted a lot of interest and need 
for impact studies in order to quantify the outcomes. However, studies that have been done so 
far concentrate their focus on crop productivity, household income (Denning et al., 2009; 
Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2009) and impacts of the demand for commercial fertilizer (Ricker 
Gilbert and Jayne 2009). At policy level, in order to realize the program objectives of 
improving food and cash crop productivity and the reduction in food insecurity, there is need 
to understand underlying causal influences of the subsidy program on farm household 
behavior regarding crop choice and cropland allocation.  
11 
 
 
2.3 Research questions  
The background provided in the foregoing chapters motivates the following research key 
questions:  
i. Does fertilizer subsidy to maize negatively influence farm households‟ decisions to 
grow other crops such as ground nuts, root/tubers, tobacco and pulses? 
ii. Does fertilizer subsidy to maize affect cropland allocation to maize, ground nuts, 
root/tubers, tobacco and pulses? 
iii. Are there systematic gender and regional differentials in the farm households‟ crop 
diversification with respect to farm households‟ participation in the fertilizer subsidy 
program? 
 
12 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Farm households’ decision making environment and context 
The basic economic theory of farm production and management in any given locality simply 
revolves around farm household decisions regarding what to produce, how much to produce 
and how to produce (Ellis, 1993). Essentially, these decisions necessitate crop choices and 
cropland allocation and have implications for farm household‟s crop diversification level 
(Nkonya et al., 2004). Such decisions are relatively simple for farmers when they follow a 
particular crop rotation plan. However, for many smallholder farmers in Malawi, crop rotation 
has become more difficult to practise due to population pressure on land which has resulted 
into smaller land sizes, land fragmentation and the need for mixed cropping (Malawi 
Government, 2003). 
Farm households will typically make crop choice and cropland allocation decisions 
simultaneously (Hua and Hite, 2005). These decisions can be influenced not only by farm 
household characteristics but also government policies such as fertilizer subsidy program (Di 
Falco and Perrings, 2005; Westcott and Young, 2004; Wu and Brorsen, 1995). In turn, crop 
choice and cropland allocation decisions not only determine agricultural production levels, but 
also affect land resource conditions, crop diversification, levels of farm income and household 
food security and welfare. These decisions have therefore become current issues of concern 
for both rural people and policy makers (Wu et al., 2008; Malawi Government and World 
Bank, 2006; Hua and Hite, 2005).  
 
Farm households make crop choice and cropland allocation decisions within their own 
production risk and uncertainty management strategies, income diversification strategies and 
market access constraints (Zeller et al., 1998; Babcock et al., 1987; Chavas and Holt, 1990; 
Collender and Zilberman, 1985; Pender et al., 2004). Therefore agricultural support programs 
in the form of fertilizer subsidies help to relax some of these constraints while offering 
13 
 
 
economic and financial incentives that also influence farmers‟ crop choices and land 
allocation (Chembezi and Womack, 1992; Duffy et al., 1994; McDonald & Sumner, 2003; 
Rashid et al., 2004). This study therefore considers these household decisions, conditional on 
their participation in the fertilizer subsidy program.  
3.2 The Crop Choice and Cropland Allocation Framework (The Random Utility 
Model) 
In modeling crop choice and cropland allocation decisions in a developing country like 
Malawi, production and consumption decisions become inseparably linked through shadow 
prices. This is due to pervasive imperfections in the factor and commodity markets. This 
situation is perpetuated when most farm households are semi-subsistence (de Janvry et al., 
1991).  
 
When some markets are imperfect or missing for particular crops and /or some factors of 
production, goals other than profit maximization also affect crop choices and land use 
decisions and a pure profit maximization framework often fails to reflect real patterns of 
cropping and resource use and allocation for households producing primarily to meet their 
subsistence needs (Mendola, 2007). Alternatively, the random utility models have therefore 
been used to predict farm household choice behavior
7
. 
 
The random utility theory is adapted in this study following McFadden's (1974) random utility 
model. The random utility model is a sub-category of probabilistic choice models that are 
used to econometrically represent individuals' maximizing behavior (Manski, 1977). Utilities 
are regarded as random variables to reflect lack of full information about the characteristics of 
alternative choices and/or decision makers on the part of the researcher. Assuming that the 
expected utility is a random function, I specify the random utility function of each possible 
crop alternative as follows: 
                                                          
7
 The utility maximization framework accounts for both production and consumption side of the farm household 
decision making and therefore it considers farm households as both families and enterprises (Mendola, 2007).  
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),( ijtijtijtijt eVEUU                (1)
  
Simplifying equation (1) into an additive linear expression yields equation (2) 
ijtijtijt eVU            (2)
  
I decompose the utility function into two components: 1) the deterministic part, ijtV , which is 
the observed component of the latent utility of crop j of farm household i  in crop growing 
season t ; and 2) the stochastic (random) or the unexplained  component, ijte . I do this to 
reflect farm households‟ demonstrated inability to perfectly discriminate the alternatives, 
given binding constraints and uncertainties on their choices. In addition, my analysis cannot 
fully account for and measure exactly the farm households' decision making environment.  
 
In a typical revealed preference situation, in order to explain the observed choices, the interest 
is in defining the suitable form for jhtV . In economic theory, it is commonly understood that 
the kind of utility we deal with in the choice probability models is the indirect utility. It 
therefore requires converting the households' cropping pattern preference into choices by 
considering tangible factors (McFadden, 1980).  In this case, we can take farm households' 
utility ( jhtV ) to be a function of production or yield per hectare, income, consumption 
smoothing and risk reduction obtained from a given crop choice alternative conditional to 
participation in the fertilizer subsidy program. Thus a real valued function can be defined as 
equation (3) 
 
),,,/( ionriskreductnsmootingconsumptioincomeyieldproductionUU     (3)
   
Let J  be a unique finite set of crop alternatives comprising maize, tobacco, roots-tubers, 
ground nuts, tobacco and pulses which exhibits different distributions of production/yield, 
income, consumption smoothing, risk reduction that can be compared. The fundamental 
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axiom of utility theory indicates that only the choice alternative that gives the greatest utility 
is preferred. Thus a farm household i  in crop growing season t  will assign a utility level ijtU  
to each crop alternative Jj ,...,2,1 .and compares the maximum expected utility derived from 
each possible crop choice and land allocation. The crop alternative that the household 
presumes will yield maximum expected utility is chosen. 
 
Because of the stochastic component in the utility function, researchers can predict farm 
household's decisions only up to a probability of alternatives of crop choice/cropland 
allocation decisions. The probability that farm household i will choose crop alternative j from 
a set of available J alternatives in crop growing season  t   can be expressed as follows: 
)Pr():( iktijtitit UUJjP   for all Jk , jk        (4) 
Assuming the stochastic terms are independently and identically distributed, the probability 
that farm household i  chooses a crop alternative j is equal to the probability that the utility 
from crop j  is the highest of all of all crop utilities within the farmers‟ crop choice set J .  
 
Given the nature of the utility function (the deterministic and stochastic components), the 
choice preference probability can be re-written as: 
)Pr()Pr():( iktiktijtijtitit eVeVJjP   for all Jk , jk      (5) 
Or  
)Pr()Pr():( iktijtiktijtitit eeVVJjP   for all Jk , jk      (6) 
Equation (7) shows that the farm households' choice decisions are not only influenced by 
comparative returns or utilities from the alternatives denoted by  ijt , but also household level 
characteristics, ijtZ , plot level characteristics, ijt  and policy level factors 
(access/participation in the input subsidy program), ijt . 
),,( ijtijtijtijtijtijt ZUU           (7) 
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The above framework provides the basis upon which farm household's crop choice and 
cropland allocation behavior can be modeled. This however heavily depends on sensible 
assumptions on the variables influencing the expected utility of choice alternatives and the 
probabilistic structure of the utility function (McFadden, 1980). Section 4.3 provides details 
for the statistical procedures involved in the estimation of farm household's crop choice and 
cropland allocation decisions.  
 
3.3 Linkages between farm households’ crop choice, cropland allocation decisions, 
crop diversification and participation in the fertilizer subsidy program and implications 
Figure 2 illustrate conceptually the linkages and the implications in the relationships between 
farm households‟ crop choice, cropland allocation decisions, crop diversification and 
participation in the fertilizer subsidy program. In figure 2, I illustrate that crop production 
decisions including crop choice/cropland allocation are determined by the choice of income 
strategies. Income strategies are in turn affected by national, community, household levels 
factors and government policy strategies including the fertilizer subsidy program. Outcomes 
from the crop production decisions in turn influence decisions by policy makers, farm 
household income strategies and cropping decisions. 
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 Source: Adapted from Nkonya et. al. ( 2004 ) 
 
 
A rich body of literature and theoretical work investigates the role of agricultural input 
subsidies in influencing farm households‟ crop production decisions (Doroodian and Boyd, 
1999; Guyomard et al., 1996; Holden et al., 2004; Lee and Helmberger, 1985; McDonald and 
Sumner, 2003). In addition, the role of input subsidies have been analyzed in the context of 
decoupled payments effecting farmers‟ acreage decisions for the United States Farm Bill 
Policy (Westcott & Young 2004) and European Union‟s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
(Guyomard et. al., 1996). Crawford et al. (2006) provide an outline of empirical findings on 
the role of agricultural input subsidies in this regard. 
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Figure 2: Linkages between crop choices, cropland allocation, crop diversification & fertilizer subsidy 
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Arguments in favor of subsidies indicate that agricultural input subsidies can have green 
revolution outcomes because they play a primary role in promoting the adoption of new 
technologies and increasing agricultural productivity. This is achieved by improvement in 
farmers‟ liquidity8 and reducing their risk aversion from investing in fertilizer inputs 
(Dorward et. al., 2008). In this way, fertilizer subsidies can be seen as important for correcting 
missing or imperfect markets. Fertilizer subsidies also offset high fertilizer prices caused by 
high transport costs and limited market development. Therefore fertilizer subsidies encourage 
farmers to use fertilizer thereby influencing crop production decisions. Finally, fertilizer 
subsidies can reduce credit needs (Rao, 1989).  
 
Based on the CGE model simulation for  Mexico, (Doroodian and Boyd, 1999) found that  a 
subsidy reduction for corn had a direct negative effect on corn production level. A subsidy 
reduction by 100 percent resulted into corn production decline of 20 percent through cropland 
reduction. On the other hand, production of other crops increased by 8 percent owing to 
shifting of input resources (land, labor and other key inputs) from corn to competing crops. 
Similar results were found in Ethiopia where a reduction in fertilizer subsidy caused a 
reduction in cereal production. Increases in the price of fertilizer caused shifts to crops that are 
less fertilizer intensive or pulses that grow without fertilizer (Holden et al., 2004). 
 
Other roles have been perceived to be paradoxically negative. Ellis (1992)  argues that 
fertilizer subsidies distort the allocation of farm resources such that they encourage inefficient 
substitution of a scarce resource for an abundant resource (e.g. chemical fertilizer for labor); 
inefficient substitution of crops towards those that use the subsidized fertilizer despite market 
demand patterns favoring the substituted crops
9
. This may in a way also discourage crop 
diversification in the sense that farmers are guaranteed for the availability of inputs for the 
supported crops especially if the weather conditions are favorable. Less diversification implies 
                                                          
8
 Decision to grow tobacco depends on farmers‟ ability to purchase inputs especially fertilizer as it is a fertilizer intensive 
crop. 
9 However, subsidized inputs may be diverted to farmer own favored but unsubsidized crops. 
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less crop rotation due to monocropping and crop intensification which leads to soil 
degradation and it discourages farmers from applying more sustainable land use practices 
such as the use of organic manure and agro-forestry technologies (Vavra and Colman, 2003). 
 
From these empirical findings, it can be generalized that fertilizer subsidies through farm 
households crop choice and cropland allocation decisions can influence the level of crop 
productivity and crop diversification, the natural resource conditions and household welfare. 
This study will only analyze the relationships between crop choice, cropland allocation, and 
input subsidy program and the implications on crop diversification. 
 
3.4 Determinants of farm households’ crop choice and cropland allocation decisions  
Farm households‟ annual crop choice and cropland allocation decisions are an outcome of 
several factors that act either individually or in interaction within the farm production 
environment. Literature in applied economics provides analysis on the determinants of crop 
choice and cropland allocation decisions both as separate and simultaneous decisions. These 
studies indicate that the major driving forces behind such farmers decisions include farm 
household and land characteristics (Bergeron and Pender, 1999), crop varietal characteristics 
(Smale et al., 1998), production (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelson, 2008) and price risks 
(Collender and Zilberman, 1985), government policies, presence of technical programmes and 
financial incentives (Chembezi and Womack, 1992; Duffy et al., 1994; Westcott and Young, 
2004).  
 
Based on the approach of Bergeron and Pender (1999) and Nkonya et al. (2004), I categorize 
these factors into three: plot level, farm household level and institutional (policy) level factors. 
The diversity of these factors arguably explains the stochastic nature of the farm production 
function.  
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Plot level factors: These are characteristics of the farm plot which vary in space and this 
variation among farm plots influence farm households‟ crop choice and cropland allocation 
patterns. Plot level factors broadly fall in the category of natural capital and they include soil 
type, soil fertility level, slope of the plot, plot distance from home, tenure (how it was 
acquired and ownership status) and other agro-ecological conditions (ibid). Empirical 
literature views these factors as the primary driving forces of changes in farm households crop 
choice and cropland allocation patterns.  
 
Plot characteristics exert a large influence on cropping patterns such that they account for 
more than twice as much cropland allocation variation as the economic and policy variables 
(Bergeron and Pender, 1999; Vavra and Colman, 2003; Wu and Brorsen, 1995). Therefore, 
analyzing the determinants of crop choice and land allocation without controlling for land 
characteristics can yield seriously misleading results (Rashid et al., 2004). 
 
However, studies on the agricultural support programs such as input subsidies that control for 
plot level characteristics are limited. Other studies have considered plot level factors such as 
biophysical factors including additional variables such as extent of fragmentation of plots and 
land management practices (use of organic or inorganic fertilizers, crop rotation, type of 
cropping system). Variability in farming practices reflects the differences in the agro-
ecological conditions. NEC, NSO and IFPRI (2001) identified 8 agro-ecological zones in 
Malawi. These are the Lower Shire Valley, the Shire Highlands and Lake Chilwa Plains, the 
Central Highlands, the Middle, Upper Shire and Southern Lake Shore, the Central mid-
altitude plateaus, the Central Lake Shore and Bwanje Valley, the Northern mid-altitude 
plateau and the Northern Lake Shore. The sampled districts fall in three of these zones.  
 
The theoretical impact of most of these factors on cropping patterns is ambiguous. Kan and 
Kimhi (2005) found that an increase in land fragmentation was not significant in one year but 
in the other year and for some crops but not for other crops. In addition the effect of an 
increase in plot size had both significant positive and negative outcomes for the different 
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crops and their corresponding yields. An increase in farm size increases the proportion of 
cropland allocation to a particular crop alternative. However, the increase in farm size may 
lead to yield decrease due to the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity 
(Heltberg, 1998). 
 
Farm household level factors: These constitute demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the farm household and they include sex, age and education of the head of 
household, household labour endowment, household's endowments of physical assets such as 
farm size, livestock, household access to credit and attitude towards risk (Collender and 
Zilberman, 1985; Feder, 1980; Pender et al., 2004). These factors explain farm households‟ 
management ability and access to factors of production and their motives and preferences 
including attitude towards risk. Therefore they influence farm households‟ decisions about 
crop choice and cropland allocation (Bergeron and Pender, 1999).  
 
Following Nkonya et al. (2004), I broadly categorized these factors into i) physical capital 
(farm size, livestock and other household's assets); ii) human capital comprises sex, age and 
education of the head of household and household labour; iii) financial capital includes farm 
household's liquid financial asset and access to credit. Depending on the extent to which 
markets are imperfect or missing, household level factors affect the household's ability to 
finance crop production decisions such as purchasing of inputs and hiring of additional labor. 
However, financial constraints may also induce labor constraints, especially when the family 
labor is not sufficient. During the peak season, there is often need for hired labor but the 
household lacks liquidity to finance it (Zeller et al., 1998). This may in turn affect crop choice and 
cropland allocation decisions. 
 
According to Pender et al. ( 2004) and Zeller et al. (1998), agro-ecological conditions, human 
capital and social capital may also influence cropping pattern through crop yields. Farmers' 
crop yield expectations play an important role in farm households‟ crop choice and land 
allocation decisions (Arslan, 2008; Smale et al., 1994). Well educated and experienced (old 
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age) farmers will make better informed choices. This is because they have the ability to collect 
and interpret extension messages and they possess more knowledge of their socioeconomic 
environment (Pender et al., 2004). Vavra and Colman (2003) argue that the influence of these 
factors can be so strong that they effectively mask effect of prices and profitability. 
 
Policy and institutional level factors: These relate to farm household's access to or 
participation in agricultural support programs (e.g. fertilizer subsidy program) and farmer 
organizations, access to produce, input and credit markets and public infrastructure such as all 
weather roads. Vavra and Colman (2003) also urge that although plot and household 
characteristics account for a great part for the explanation for heterogeneity in farm 
households‟ behavior in terms of cropping pattern, it is essential to recognize such 
heterogeneity given market conditions and the agricultural policy support in place.  
 
Farm households‟ participation and access to these programs and services significantly 
influence their crop choice and cropland allocation decisions. Fertilizer subsidy offers the 
farm households opportunities for reducing the high transaction costs, production risks and 
constraints (Feder, 1980; Nkonya et al., 2004).  
 
On the other hand, this creates a conflict in the allocation of the cropland to alternative crops 
given that land availability is limited (De, 2005). Subsidy will influence the re-allocation of 
farm inputs such as labor towards crops that are expected to yield high returns either in terms 
of crop yields and/or revenue. Crop specific financial support in terms of fertilizer subsidies 
tends to create an incentive to grow the most supported crop leading to a reduction in crop 
diversification. Farm households will tend to allocate most of their land to the single most 
supported crop instead of diversifying in order to manage risk (Chembezi and Womack, 1992; 
Di Falco and Perrings, 2005; McDonald and Sumner, 2003). 
In Malawi, technical change that enhances productivity in maize production has the potential 
to influence farm households‟ crop choice and land allocation decisions. Such a change 
encourages crop intensification which makes it possible for the farmers to obtain high enough 
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crop yields for the households food needs, but from a smaller crop area. Consequently, farm 
households can then reallocate land from maize to other important food staples as well as high 
value crops (Smale, 1995). If the current input subsidies contribute to this kind of outcome, 
then crop intensification and crop diversification may be viewed to be complementing each 
other.  
Based on the evidence gathered from literature, I model crop choice and cropland allocation 
by depicting a Malawian smallholder farmer who decides to allocate their land among 
different crops taking into consideration their socioeconomic circumstances, plot level factors, 
crop type characteristics, input availability and the financial incentive derived from their 
participation into the fertilizer subsidy program through access to the subsidy coupon.  
 
3.5 Determinants of farm households’ access to and participation in the fertilizer 
subsidy program 
I capture farm households‟ participation into fertilizer subsidy program in this study by 
considering whether they accessed subsidy coupons either through direct targeting using the 
official targeting criteria or by buying from private traders or fellow villagers. According to 
Ricker -Gilbert and Jayne (2009), the beneficiary targeting process for the subsidy coupons is 
long and complex as the allocation of subsidy coupons starts at regional level, then district 
and extension planning area (EPA) level, and finally at village level. Allocation of coupons at 
regional level is based on the total number of hectares under cultivation.  
 
At village level, participation into the fertilizer subsidy program depends on a combination of 
a number of subjective factors which comprise both official and informal targeting criteria. 
Village development committees and village chiefs are supposed to identify beneficiaries of 
the subsidized inputs based on the following official criteria: the poorest and most vulnerable 
households (measured by levels of food stocks or social categories such as widows, elderly, 
orphans, disabled); those with access to land (including those who mange to rent in); those 
with access to cash for the redeeming of the coupon; those with the capacity to adopt/utilize 
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the technology. Other farm household characteristics that determine access and participation 
into the subsidy program include the proximity of households to tarred roads, towns and 
ADMARC
10
 depots. Households close to the ADMARC depots are said to be more likely to 
receive subsidy coupons than those very far away (Doward et al., 2008).  
The outlined targeting criteria are discriminatory against poor female headed households even 
though they are the principal targets on the social vulnerability basis. Female headed 
households are resource poor in terms of access to both land and cash resources. The informal 
targeting criteria is mainly employed by village leaders to include households‟ relation to 
village leaders, number of years that the household has lived in the village and if the 
household had a civil servant and other various non-economic factors (Ricker-Gilbert and 
Jayne, 2009). The combination of formal and informal criteria reflects the differences in 
access to the fertilizer subsidy among the regions. However, some criteria such as farm size 
were most commonly used in most districts. Households with bigger land size were more 
likely to receive subsidized coupons than those with small land size. 
3.6 Hypotheses  
The general theoretical framework and literature evidence outlined above are helpful in 
generating the following testable hypotheses: 
 
H1:  Crop specific input subsidy to maize will reduce the diversity of crops grown in favor 
of maize. 
H2: Crop specific input subsidies positively affect cropland allocation of the supported 
crop (maize) but will reduce cropland allocated to other major crops such as tobacco, 
cassava, ground nuts, sweet potatoes and ground nuts. 
H3: There are systematic differences in the farm households‟ crop diversification levels 
between the regions and between male headed and female headed farm households. 
                                                          
10 ADMARC is a statutory corporation responsible for purchasing and selling farmers‟ crop produce. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Survey methodology  
Malawi is administratively divided into three regions with a total of 28 districts. The data used 
in this study are from a sample of smallholder farm households from Kasungu and Lilongwe 
districts in the central region and Zomba, Chiradzulu, Machinga and Thyolo districts in the 
southern region of Malawi (See annex 5 for map of the sample districts and study sites). The 
data set is part of the larger three-year (2006, 2007 and 2009) panel survey under the NOMA 
program
11
. The choice of these districts is purposive, typically to account for the differences 
in the farm households cropping pattern decisions between regions and agro-economic 
zones
12
. Kasungu and Lilongwe districts are in the mid altitude plateau agro-ecological zone 
in the central region while Zomba and Chiradzulu districts lie in the Shire Highlands  and 
southern lake shore zone and Machinga district is in the middle and upper Shire River valley 
and southern lakeshore (NEC, NSO and IFPRI, 2001). 
 
Sampling of the study sites was based on the primary sampling units (PSU) obtained for the 
national integrated household survey (IHS) of 2004 by the National Statistical Office of 
Malawi. In each of these districts: Thyolo, Chiradzulu and Machinga, at least two PSUs were 
randomly selected but for Zomba, Kasungu and Lilongwe districts, three PSUs were selected. 
At least 30 households were randomly selected from each PSU.  A detailed questionnaire was 
administered for household and all plots information (refer to annex 6 for the questionnaire 
used in 2009 survey). The questionnaires were administered to the same households for the 
three rounds (2006, 2007 and 2009) with some addition of new households in 2007 and 2009 
                                                          
11
 NOMA program is a collaborative masters program between universities from the South 
(Malawi, Uganda and Ethiopia) and the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
12
 Malawi is divided into eight agro-ecological zones and the sites in this paper fall into three 
of these zones. 
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to make up for attrition. There were also some additions and revisions to the questionnaire in 
2007 and 2009 surveys. Geographical Positioning System (GPS) equipment was used to 
physically measure household land sizes. After cleaning the data and selection of relevant 
variables, a total sample size of 458 households was obtained for analysis in this study. 
The farm households are multi-crop growers who choose among a wide set of crops 
commonly grown either in a mono-cropping or mixed cropping system. However, in order to 
have sufficient observations to model each crop choice-cropland allocations decision, the crop 
choices were put into the following five categories: maize, tobacco, ground nuts, root-tubers 
and pulses. These categories are analyzed as major crops assuming each of these choices is 
independent of the minor crops. Thus, for computational simplicity, no crop combinations are 
considered in this study; also because of incomplete availability of data on crop combinations.  
4.2 Data problems 
This study is based on household level analysis. However, most of the data were collected at 
plot level. It was computationally difficult to convert plot level variables into household level. 
In some study sites, respondent households seemed to be tired of being interviewed and they 
refused to be interviewed. This brings about attrition problems. To overcome such problems, 
new households were added for replacement. It was difficult to collect price data at household 
level for the various crops. It depends on whether the household participated in a given crop 
sales in order to be able obtain precise data.  
4.3 Specification of the econometric models  
Empirical analysis in this study investigates two key relationships in line with the research 
objectives and hypotheses (H1-H2). The first model examines the relationship between farm 
household‟s access to input subsidy and crop diversification. This model explores whether or 
not crop-specific subsidy to maize encourages the diversification in terms of number of crops 
grown. The second model explores how crop-specific input subsidy for maize affect farm 
household‟s crop choices and cropland allocation to other major crops such as tobacco, 
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ground nuts and roots and tubers (sweet potatoes and cassava). In addition, study also assesses 
gender and regional variations in crop diversification levels. 
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Model I:  Crop Diversification 
Following Joshi et al. (2004), I use the Simpson Index of Diversification to assess the 
relationship between farm household‟s access to the input subsidy for maize and the level of 
crop diversification. The index is computed and interpreted as follows: 







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1           (8) 
Where  htSID  refers to the Simpson Index of crop diversification for household h in crop  
growing season t  
jn  denotes the proportionate share of cropland allocated to crop j in the farm 
households‟ total cropland area 
N  denotes the total land endowment for household h for allocating the different 
s number of crop activities. 
The index values range between 0 and 1. The value of zero indicates complete crop 
specialization while the value of 1 indicates maximum diversification. A farm household with 
no diversity, having only one crop type on its plot (s), such that 1s  and Nn j  , then its 
crop diversification index will be zero. When the farm household increases crop diversity, its 
crop diversification index ( SID ) will approach unity. 
I then use the calculated index in a linear regression model as a dependent variable to examine 
how farm households‟ access to input subsidy and other key factors influence crop 
diversification. This model is used to test hypothesis (H1) by assessing the significance of 
access to input subsidy dummy variable in the diversification index equation, while 
controlling for household and plot characteristics and also district and regional heterogeneity. 
A positive (negative) significant coefficient for access to input subsidy indicates that access to 
input subsidy for maize encourages (discourages) crop diversification. This outcome is also 
checked with the crop choice and cropland allocation equation. The regression model is 
specified as follows: 
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hthththt eSXSID  
'          (9) 
In equation (9), htSID denotes the level of crop diversification in crop growing season t   for 
household h and  it depends on household and plot characteristics, district and regional factors 
(dummies) denoted by a vector htX  and farm households‟ access to input subsidy ( htS ).   is 
a vector of the corresponding coefficients for the explanatory variables ( htX )  and it is 
assumed to have no correlation with the disturbance term ( hte ). The disturbance term, hte , is 
assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and variance, 2 . The coefficient   
measures the effect of farm households‟ access to input subsidy ( htS ) on the level of crop 
diversification.  
 
Empirical estimation of equation (9) is based on pooled panel data using instrumentation 
techniques to control for the endogeneity of the access to input subsidy. With crop 
diversification as a continuous dependent variable and access to fertilizer subsidy as an 
endogenous binary variable, the treatment effects model is chosen as a suitable estimator in 
order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of effect of access to fertilizer subsidy. The 
treatment effects model uses the predicted probability of access to fertilizer subsidy obtained 
in the first stage and using it to estimate the crop diversification equation in the second stage. 
Thus, I use equation (9) in the second stage and the equation (10) is used as first stage. 
 
However, the treatment effects model used in this estimation applies the maximum likelihood 
procedure while correcting for clustering at household level to ensure robustness of the 
results. The probability of farm household‟s access to fertilizer subsidy is modeled as a linear 
function of factors determining farm household‟s access to subsidy ( 'itW ) and the disturbance 
term ( jtv ). 
 
Factors determining access to fertilizer subsidy are derived from the government 
administrative targeting criteria which include female headed households, elderly headed 
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households, land-poor households, asset- poor households. The probability of access to 
fertilizer subsidy is specified as unobserved latent variable ( *itS ) as follows: 
 
jtitit vWS  
'*
               (10) 
Where the observed variable ( itS ) is defined as 
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The disturbance terms hte  and jtv  are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution 
structure with mean zero and the following covariance matrix: 
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For the further details on the specific explanatory variables, their measurement and 
hypothesized effect refer to tables 3 and 4 and annex 1. 
 
Model II: Crop Choice and Cropland Allocation Decisions 
In keeping with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter three, I consider that the farm 
household faces a joint decision problem of choosing which crops to grow and how much land 
to allocate to each of the selected crops. In this modeling framework, this joint decision is 
made conditional on households‟ participation in the fertilizer subsidy program. Further, the 
farm household makes this decision based on the maximum expected utility (returns) from 
each crop choice/land allocation possibility.  
Assuming that the total cropland available to the household for allocating to the different crop 
activities is fixed and considering that the probability of crop choice is implicit within the 
cropland allocation decision, I specify an econometric model for annual farm household‟s 
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crop choice and cropland allocation decisions with equation (12) in order to test hypothesis 
(H2): 
 
ijtitijtijt eSXA  
'
;     for i=1, 2,.., N;  j=1, 2,..., 5;  t=1, 2,3                                    (12) 
 
Equation (12) represents the farm household‟s cropland allocation decision and it forms the 
basis for assessing factors determining crop choice and cropland allocation decisions. It states 
that the cropland share of the total cropland ( ijtA ) that farm household i  allocates to crop 
type j  in crop growing season t , is a function of a vector of explanatory variables (household 
and plot characteristics, other crop type dummies, district and regional dummies), 
'
ijtX  and 
farm households‟ access to fertilizer subsidy dummy ( itS ).   is a vector of the corresponding 
coefficients for the explanatory variables, 
'
ijtX   and it is assumed to have no correlation with 
the disturbance term ( ijte ). The disturbance term, ijte , is assumed to have a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance ( 2 ).  The coefficient   measures the effect of farm 
households‟ access to input subsidy coupon ( itS ). 
 
However, estimating equation (12) by ordinary least squares (OLS) method, yields 
inconsistent and inefficient estimates due to the problems of selectivity biases. Selectivity bias 
arises because some unobservable factors in the error term ijte  are likely to induce a non-zero 
correlation with the access to fertilizer subsidy. The potential sources of selection biases are as 
follows: first, as discussed in section 3.2, farm households‟ access to input subsidy coupons is 
typically non-random and partially observable. Thus we observe program access for only the 
participant households, a non-random sub-sample. However, there are systematic differences 
in the observable and unobservable characteristics of both participants and nonparticipants of 
the program. Second, an endogenous dummy variable, access to fertilizer subsidy is included 
as a regressor in the different cropland allocation equations. Third, all crop choice/cropland 
allocation decisions are not observed for all households. Finally, fertilizer subsidy program 
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participation and cropland allocation equations are estimated based on data collected only for 
the years 2006, 2007 and 2009, while the subsidy program run continuously from 2005/2006 
through 2008/2009. Obviously, this presents a missing data problem.  
 
I therefore develop an empirical estimation framework to correct for the possible selection 
biases. Literature provides several estimation approaches to handle this problem. However, 
drawing from Gebel and Pfeiffer (2007),  I use the control function approach which I apply 
within the random effects generalized least squares (GLS) model to estimate the effect of 
fertilizer subsidy on cropland allocation patterns. The GLS estimation technique provides 
more efficient estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation arising from 
the cross-section and time series effects respectively (Woodridge, 2009). 
 
In order to control for endogeneity, the control function approach is implemented as a two-
stage estimation procedure as follows, the access to fertilizer subsidy equation (10) is 
estimated as a selection equation in the first stage in order to construct the control function 
that is included as one of the explanatory variables, together with the access to fertilizer 
dummy, in the estimation of the five cropland allocation GLS models (12) in the second stage. 
The control function is derived as a reduced form residual from equation (10), which is the 
difference between the predicted access to fertilizer subsidy and actual access to fertilizer 
subsidy. A panel probit estimator is used to estimate the access to fertilizer subsidy as 
selection equation 
ititit vWS  
'* ;                (10) 
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Again, in equation (10), farm household‟s access to fertilizer subsidy program ( *itS ), in a 
given crop growing season, t, depends on a set of explanatory variables denoted by vector itW  
whose effect is measured by a vector of coefficients,  . Like in equation (12), the disturbance 
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term ( itv ) is also assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, variance,
2
   and 
uncorrelated with itW . 
For the identification of the above specified model framework assuming that the joint 
distribution assumption of the disturbance terms hold, the “exclusion restriction” requirement 
is applied such that at least one variable that influences access to fertilizer subsidy in equation 
(10) is not included in the outcome equation (12) (Heckman et al. 1999).  
On one hand, the estimated coefficients of the reduced form residual provide information on 
the selection unobserved factors influencing cropland allocation to the different five groups of 
crops. On the other hand, the coefficient of access to fertilizer subsidy explains the effect of 
farm household‟s access to fertilizer subsidy to cropland allocation. For the reduced form 
residual, the positive (negative) coefficient implies that the unobserved factors positively 
(negatively) influence cropland allocation towards (away) from a given crop, respectively. In 
other words, the positive coefficient indicates crop intensification while the negative 
coefficient indicates cropland expansion. The same interpretation applies for estimated 
parameters for the access to subsidy. 
4.4 Definition of variables used in the analysis and the descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the definitions and measurements of the variables used in the study analysis. 
I use the explanatory variables largely as control variables, in as much as these could also be 
the determining factors in cropland allocation and crop diversification decisions. The 
explanatory variables can be grouped into four categories.  
The first category comprises the socio-economic and demographic factors which include age, 
sex and education of the head of household. These variables capture farm households‟ 
variations in experience in growing the different crops and their management capabilities and 
skills in crop production. Tropical livestock units and land size capture wealth endowment 
levels. Household labour captures the level of labour endowment while the consumer-worker 
ratio captures the ability of the household to bear different risks and shocks in crop 
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production. Distance from home to the nearest market captures the extent of transaction costs 
in factor and commodity markets.  
The second category comprises plot level factors such as the degree of land fragmentation and 
I use the number of plots as a proxy to this variable, average fertility level of the plot, slope of 
the plot and soil type.  Third, I include the year dummies to capture variations in weather, 
factor and commodity prices and other economic factors across the study period. In addition, I 
also include the district dummies to capture the differences in access to infrastructural 
facilities, technology and services and the agro-ecological differences across the six districts.  
Finally, the policy factor is represented by farm households‟ access to fertilizer subsidy. Table 3 
provides a list of variables used in the analysis, their definitions and measurement. Table 4 presents the 
hypothesized effect of some of the key variables. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analysis are provided in annex 1. 
Table 3: Variables used in the analysis, their definitions and measurement 
Variable Name Variable definition/measurement 
Dependent variables  
Crop diversification index Derived from the Simpson‟s index of diversity 
Cropland allocation to maize A fraction of the total land size allocated to maize 
Cropland allocation to ground nuts A fraction of the total land size allocated to ground nut 
Cropland allocation to tobacco A fraction of the total land size allocated to tobacco 
Cropland allocation to root-tubers A fraction of the total land size allocated to root-tubers 
Cropland allocation pulses A fraction of the total land size allocated to pulses 
  
Explanatory variables  
Access to fertilizer subsidy (1= Access, 0= No access) 
Age of the head of household Age of the head of household in units of years 
Ederly headed household 1=age of  headed of household >65 years, 0=age<65 years 
Sex of the head of household 1=female, 0 =male 
School years of the household head Years of education of the head of household 
Average plot fertility level  1= very fertile, 2=moderate fertile, 3=not fertile 
Average slope  1=flat, 2=Slight, 3=steep 
Home to plot distance Average home to plot distance in kilometers 
Average soil type  1=sand, 2=loam soil, 3= clay 
Number of children Number of children in the household 
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male labour Size of household male labour force 
female labour Size of household female labour force 
Household labour Total size of household  labour force 
Consumer-worker ratio Proportion of consumer units to household labour  
Quality of house Index for the aggregate quality of walls, roof type, and 
windows 
Real asset value Average household real asset value in Malawi Kwacha 
Tropical livestock units Index for household‟s total livestock units 
Number of plots Index for the degree of land fragmentation 
Home to market distance  Distance from home  to the nearest market point in 
kilometers 
Land size Total household land size in hectares 
Region  1=southern region, 0=central region 
District  Dummies: 1=Thyolo, 2=Zomba, 3= Chiradzulu, 
4=Machinga, 5= Kasungu, 6= Lilongwe  
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Table 4: Hypothesized effect of some explanatory variables on crop diversification and 
cropland allocation 
 Hypothesized effect of some variables 
Variable Name Crop 
diversifi- 
cation. 
Maize 
share 
gnut 
share 
tobacco 
share 
roottubers 
shares 
pulses 
share 
Access to fertilizer subsidy - + - - - - 
Age of the head of household +/-      
Elderly headed household +/-      
Sex of the head of household 
(1=female) 
 + + - + + 
School years of the household 
head 
+   +   
Average plot fertility level       
Average slope        
Home to plot distance -   -   
Average soil type        
Number of children       
male labour       
female labour       
household labour + + + + + + 
Consumer-worker ratio +/-      
Quality of house +      
Real asset value +      
Tropical livestock units +      
Number of plots +      
Home to market distance in km  -      
Land size +      
Land-labour ratio - - - - - - 
Region  (1=south) +      
District         
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Figures 3 and 4 present cropland allocation patterns in 2005/2006 and for the whole period of 
study (2006-2009). The figures show that there have been a reduction in the cropland 
allocated to maize and this reduction has been associated with an increase in the allocation of 
cropland to other crops except for legumes possibly because legume crops are usually mixed 
cropped with maize. Vegetable crops however have also registered a decrease in cropland 
shares. 
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Figure 3:  Percentage cropland shares across the six sample districts in 2006 
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Figure 4: Percentage cropland shares across the six sample districts for the whole study period 
(2006-2009)
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 Results and Discussion 
5.1 Analysis of the key variable relationships 
While the main focus of this chapter is on the econometric analysis
13
 of the effect of fertilizer 
subsidy on farm households‟ crop diversification levels and cropland allocation patterns, it is 
useful to present also some additional descriptive analyses. These analyses provide a general 
picture of the relationships between farm households‟ access to fertilizer subsidy and their 
crop diversification levels, crop choices and cropland allocation patterns.  The descriptive 
information also shows how farm households in the study sample differ by gender and region 
in terms of crop diversification and cropland allocation patterns.  
Table 5 provides two-sample t-test results of some selected key variables. The results indicate 
that there are no statistically significant differences in the mean crop diversification levels 
between the farm households that accessed the fertilizer subsidy and those that did not. The 
results also show that farm households that accessed the fertilizer subsidy have a mean crop 
diversification level of 0.329 while those that did not access the fertilizer subsidy have a mean 
crop diversification level of 0.306, but this difference is not statistically significant. At 
regional level, the results show that southern region has a statistically significant lower mean 
crop diversification level (0.272) than the central region (0.385). In terms of gender, I find that 
there is a statistically significant difference between female headed households and male 
headed households. Female headed households have significantly lower mean crop 
diversification level (0.247) than their male counterparts (0.346). Figure 5 illustrates these 
gender and regional differentials crop diversification levels in a graph.  
 
                                                          
13 All the regression analyses were done in STATA 
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Table 5: Two-Sample T-test of equal variance for key selected variables 
Variable No of 
observation 
Mean Standard 
error 
t-statistic p-value 
Crop diversification index      
Access to fertilizer subsidy 683 0.329 0.009 -1.4805 0.1390 
No access to fertilizer subsidy 424 0.306 0.012   
Maize area share of the total cropland      
Access to fertilizer subsidy 683 0.584 0.013 0.8923 0.3724 
No access to fertilizer subsidy 424 0.606 0.017   
Ground nut area share of the total cropland    
Access to fertilizer subsidy 683 0.099 0.007 0.8923 0.3724 
No access to fertilizer subsidy 424 0.110 0.010   
tobacco area share of the total cropland      
Access to fertilizer subsidy 683 0.075 0.008 -1.22377 0.2213 
No access to fertilizer subsidy 424 0.061 0.007   
Root and tubers area share      
Access to fertilizer subsidy 683 0.060 0.006 -0.5877 0.5568 
No access to fertilizer subsidy 424 0.055 0.007   
Crop diversification index      
Female headed households 285 0.247 0.015 5.7745 0.0000 
Male headed households 822 0.346 0.009   
Crop diversification index    
Southern region 475 0.035 0.011 7.6214 0.0000 
Central region 632 0.272 0.010   
Source: NOMA household survey sample data 
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Figure 5: Mean farm household crop diversification over gender of head of household and 
region 
In terms of cropland allocation to maize, ground nut, tobacco and roots and tubers, the t-test 
results in table 5 show that there are no statistically significant differences in all these cases 
between the households that accessed fertilizer subsidy and those that did not. However, 
figure 6 shows that there are some variations in the cropland allocation patterns across years.  
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Figure 6: Cropland allocation pattern between fertilizer subsidized households and non-
subsidized households  
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Based on these t-test results and the graphical analyses, it may therefore not be appropriate to 
make firm claims and conclusions regarding the relationships between farm household‟s crop 
diversification levels, cropland allocation patterns and their access to input subsidy at this 
point. This is because we do not control for many other factors both at farm household and 
district levels that may also explain changes in farm cropland allocation patterns and crop 
diversification. We would therefore rely on the econometric estimation results for any 
inferences and implications. 
5.2 Effect of fertilizer subsidy on farm households’ crop diversification level 
The crop diversification equation (9) was estimated using the treatment effects model based 
on pooled panel data. The treatment effects model simultaneously estimates crop 
diversification (outcome) equation and the access to fertilizer subsidy (treatment) equation by 
assuming that the error terms of these two equations have a particular joint normal distribution 
(Greene, 2003). This helps to control for endogeneity bias arising from the use of access to 
subsidy dummy variable in the estimation of crop diversification equation.  
The likelihood ratio test of independence of equations gives a p-value of 0.0022 indicating 
that rho is significantly different from zero and therefore the endogeneity bias has been 
controlled for. Quality of the house and number of children were used as relevant instrumental 
variables for the participation equation. Validity of these instruments was tested with 
instrumental variable regression (ivreg), as this was not possible with the treatment effects 
model. These two variables were both found to be statistically significant and positive at 5 
percent level of significance. A positive sign for the estimated coefficient for quality of house 
suggests that the targeting process is biased towards the better off households. These findings 
are in accord with other earlier study findings on the impacts of fertilizer subsidy program in 
Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2009; Doward et al., 2008).  
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the treatment effects model. Estimation was done 
with robust standard errors to ensure robustness of results. Estimation results for the selection 
equations (access to fertilizer subsidy) are presented separately in annex 2. 
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Table 6: Treatment effects model for the effect of access to fertilizer subsidy on crop 
diversification level 
Independent Variable Parameter Estimates 
(Outcome Equation) 
Robust Standard 
error 
Log of square of age of head of household  -0.033    0.070 
age of head of household in years 0.001    0.003 
sex of head of household -0.035    0.023 
land-labor ratio 0.009    0.034 
land size -0.011    0.013 
Education level of head of household -0.0002    0.002 
Average plot fertility level 2 (average fertile) -0.001    0.018 
Average plot fertility level 3 (not fertile) -0.005    0.021 
Average slope 2 (slight) -0.008    0.017 
Average slope 3 (steep) 0.011    0.041 
Average soil type 2 (loam soil) 0.009    0.017 
Average soil type 3 (clay soil) 0.024    0.021 
Average home to plot distance in km -0.008*   0.005 
Consumer-worker ratio 0.090**  0.039 
male labour -0.009    0.009 
female labour 0.022*   0.012 
Total household livestock units -0.011**  0.006 
Log of household total real asset value ( MK) 0.011**  0.005 
Degree of land fragmentation 0.086*** 0.006 
Log of home to nearest market distance in km 0.002    0.006 
year_2007 (dummy) -0.003    0.032 
year_2009 (dummy) -0.010    0.036 
Region (1=south, 0= central) -0.203*** 0.037 
Zomba District (dummy) 0.068**  0.032 
Chiradzulu District (dummy) 0.012    0.046 
Machinga District (dummy) 0.190*** 0.045 
Kasungu District (dummy) -0.034    0.026 
Access to fertilize subsidy (dummy) 0.287*** 0.081 
Constant -0.046    0.393 
athrho constant -0.921*** 0.301 
lnsigma constant -1.484*** 0.090 
prob>chi2 0.0000  
Wald Chi2 (26) 470.29  
Log peudolikelihood ratio -257.795  
Number of observations of equations 710  
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Estimates are presented as marginal effects at the mean values of the explanatory variables. Significant levels (* 10 percent, 
**5 percent, ***1 percent). Log likelihood test of independence of equations (rho=0):  chi2(1)= 9.35 
Prob>chi2=0.0022.Lilongwe District and age of household in the 2nd stage estimation were dropped because of 
multicollinearity. For the categorical dummy variables, the base categories were automatically dropped. These are: 
year=2006, district=Thyolo, Soil type= soil type 1(sandy soil), slope= slope1 (flat), plot fertility= plot fertility level 1(very 
fertile) 
 
These results reveal that several factors, both at farm and policy level influence the level of 
crop diversification at farm household level. First, contrary to the hypothesis, the findings 
provide strong evidence that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
the crop-specific fertilizer subsidy to maize and the level of farm household crop 
diversification. While controlling for farm household socio-economic and plot characteristics, 
the results indicate that farm households‟ participation in the fertilizer subsidy is associated 
with an increase in the crop diversification level of about 29 percent at 1 percent level of 
significance, ceteris paribus.  
These findings support the theoretical argument that crop specific subsidies encourage crop 
diversification, possibly through land intensification in favor of the subsidized crop. 
According to Smale (1995), technology-induced land intensification, which in the case of 
Malawi is supported by fertilizer subsidies, can help farmers to release the unused land for the 
cultivation of other crops, subject to availability of other input resources needed to support the 
growing of these other crops. Thus the outcome rejects the null hypothesis that crop-specific 
subsidies will discourage crop diversification in favor of the subsidized crop(s). 
This outcome has implications for the overall household income diversification and therefore 
welfare in general. The reason is that in Malawi, a great part of the rural household income is 
derived from crop sales
14
 (Malawi Government and World Bank, 2006). Therefore more crop 
diversification may also imply an improvement in income diversification as crop income will 
now be derived from more crops, assuming that there is an available functioning commodity 
market within the district and /or at village community level. Income diversification in turn 
                                                          
14
 Non-farm income sources for rural Malawian households are limited to ganyu (casual labour). Three quarter of farm household income is 
derived from agriculture  (Malawi Government and World Bank, 2006) 
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implies improved household welfare and lessened vulnerability to risks and shocks such as 
price fluctuation, crop failure due to drought or pest attacks. As the same, improved income 
diversification can enhance household‟s resilience to these risks and shocks. 
On the other hand, it is also important to recognize the effect of control variables in the model. 
In line with findings in Wu and Brorsen (1994), my results show that farm household and plot 
level factors are also statistically significant in influencing farm household crop 
diversification level. In terms of farm household socio-economic variables, the regression 
results indicate that the gender of the head of household, total household land size, consumer-
worker ratio and the number of livestock units are statistically significant in influencing the 
level of crop diversification at household level, ceteris paribus.  
I also find that the number of plots, a proxy for the degree of land fragmentation and the 
distance from home to the plot are similarly significant influencing factors of crop 
diversification level.  However, the study findings show that age of the head of household, 
education level of the household head, land quality variables (soil types, slope of the plot and 
the general plot fertility level), distance from home to the nearest market and the year 
dummies did not have statistically significant effect on the level of farm household‟s crop 
diversification. 
The consumer-worker ratio, a proxy for the ability of the household to bear risk and shocks
15
, 
was found to be positively correlated with the level of farm households‟ crop diversification; 
implying that less able farm households will diversify their crop portfolios to hedge against 
risks and shocks. As expected, total household land size and the degree of land fragmentation 
were found to have a statistically positive significant influence on the farm household‟s crop 
diversification level. The effect of land fragmentation may imply that crop diversification 
could be one of the adaptation measures that households employ in response to the problem of 
land pressure due to the rising population density in the country. 
                                                          
15
 The higher the consumer-worker ratio, the less capable the household is in managing the various risks and shocks. 
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The results show that there are no systematic differences in crop diversification between male 
and female headed households. Female headed households are less likely to diversify their 
crop portfolios than male headed households, but such differences are not statistically 
significant. However, significant differences in crop diversification exit at regional level. 
Southern region is associated with less crop diversification than the central region. The lower 
level of crop diversification in the southern region could indicate that fewer households grow 
cash crops such as tobacco and ground nuts than it is the case in the central region. 
One limitation in the use of the Simpson‟s index for measuring the level of crop 
diversification is that as an overall indicator, it fails to account for the balance in cropland 
cultivated among the crops (Duc and Waibel, 2009). It is also difficult to infer from the index 
to which crop (s) most of the household‟s resources are flowing. The next section therefore 
provides an analysis of the relationship between farm household‟s access to fertilizer and crop 
choice and cropland allocation patterns.  
5.3 Effect of fertilizer subsidy on farm households’ crop choice and cropland 
allocation patterns 
Under the assumption of fixed total land input and multi-crop setting, farm households‟ 
cropland allocation decisions involve a zero-sum game such that an increase in the land 
allocated to one crop results in a reduction in the amount of land allocated to the other crops 
(Perz, 2002).  To investigate this phenomenon, the control function approach was applied 
within the random effects generalized least squares (GLS) model to estimate the effect of 
fertilizer subsidy on cropland allocation patterns using equation (12), and the analysis was 
based on pooled panel data. In order to control for the endogeneity of the access to fertilizer 
subsidy variable, the reduced form residual and the access to fertilizer subsidy dummy itself 
were included in the GLS model as regressors.  
A panel probit estimator was used to estimate the access to fertilizer subsidy as selection 
equation (10) in the first stage, after which the reduced from residual was obtained and a GLS 
estimator was used to estimate the five cropland share equations in the second stage. The 
regression results of panel probit model are provided in table 8 in the annex section. Table 7 
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presents the GLS-control function model results for the effect of access to fertilizer subsidy on 
cropland allocation for maize, ground nuts, tobacco, root-tubers and legumes. Regression results 
for cropland shares for other cereals (millet, sorghum and rice) and vegetable crops have not 
been included because the models were statistically insignificant.  Full details for the 
explanatory variables used in the GLS model regression results are provided in the annex 4.  
Table 7: GLS-Control function model results for the effect of access to fertilizer subsidy 
on cropland allocation 
Dependent Variable Parameter Estimates 
(Access to fertilizer 
subsidy) 
Standard 
error 
Maize cropland share -0.104**  0.051 
Ground nut cropland share 0.010   0.008 
Tobacco cropland share 0.036*** 0.012 
Root-tubers cropland share 0. 046***  0.012 
Pulses cropland share -0.025***    0.006 
prob>chi2 0.0000  
Number of observations of equations 702
16
  
Significant levels (* 10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent).  
 
The results in Table 7 show that for the estimated cropland shares equations of ground nut, 
tobacco and tubers, access to fertilizer subsidy variable has a positive effect while the 
coefficient for fertilizer subsidy in the maize and pulses cropland share estimated equations 
are negative. The negative coefficient for fertilizer subsidy in the estimated maize and pulses 
cropland share equations suggests that there is cropland intensification in favour of maize and 
legumes. On the other hand, the positive coefficient for subsidy in the ground nut, tobacco and 
roots/tubers models indicate that cropland allocation these crops are expanding. Pulses 
(legumes) are mostly inter-planted with maize; it is therefore not surprising to obtain a 
negative coefficient for pulses. Hence this confirms that farm households‟ access to fertilizer 
subsidy is positively associated with intensification for maize. The regression results therefore 
                                                          
16
 Equation for pluses was estimates with 399 observations 
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provide evidence against the null hypothesis that maize-specific subsidies will increase 
cropland allocation for maize and reduce the allocation to other major crops. 
In the maize cropland share estimated equation, farm households‟ participation in the fertilizer 
subsidy program is associated with a decrease in cropland allocated to maize of 10 percent at 
5 percent significance level, ceteris paribus. The cropland share estimated equation for 
tobacco and root-tubers indicate that access to fertilizer subsidy is associated with 4 and 5 
percent increase in cropland allocated to tobacco and root-tubers respectively, at 1 percent 
level of significance, ceteris paribus. However, the positive effect of access to fertilizer 
subsidy in the cropland allocation to ground nut cropland share equation is not statistically 
significant. Intuitively, it is expected that the decrease in the cropland share to maize should 
come with a corresponding increment in the cropland land shares to other crops. This is not 
reflected in this analysis as not all crops were estimated. Small other crops including 
vegetables were left out in the analysis due to insufficient number of observations and 
seasonal differences
17
.  
In accounting for the effect of control variables on farm households‟ cropland allocation 
pattern; the positive (negative) coefficient for the reduced form residuals implies that 
unobserved factors lead to increased cropland allocation to maize and pulses but a reduction 
in the cropland allocation to ground nuts, tobacco and root-tubers respectively. The findings 
further show that the household and plot level factors statistically and significantly contribute 
to explaining farm households‟ crop choice and cropland allocation behavior.  At household 
level, the findings show that the size of total household land holdings encourages cropland 
allocation away from maize in favour of other crops including ground nuts, tobacco and root-
tubers at 1 percent level of significance, holding all other factors constant. For maize, the 
coefficient for land size is positive but not statistically significant. 
Other household and plot level factors including distance from home to plot, soil quality, 
education, age of head of household, distance from home to market, sex of headed of 
                                                          
17
 Mostly vegetables are grown in winter, while all other crops are grown in summer. 
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household, district and year dummies, etc have either statistically significant or insignificant 
but with mixed results in terms of their influence on cropland allocation to the different crops 
(see annex 4 for details). 
In reconciling the crop diversification and cropland allocation regression results, the findings 
suggest that there is generally a positive correlation between cropland intensification in favour 
of maize and the farm household crop diversification levels. The study findings revealed that 
more cropland intensification in favour of maize is associated with increased crop 
diversification levels. These results are in line with the findings in (Holden et al., 2004) in 
Ethiopia and in Mexico where an increase in the subsidy was found to have a corresponding 
increase in cereal/corn production and vice versa (Doroodian and Boyd, 1999). 
Crop prices constitute one of the major determinants of cropland allocation to various crops at 
household level.  However, this study captured more than twenty crops and price data for all 
of the crops could not be collected at household level, resulting in missing observations for 
crop prices. In the context of imperfect factor and commodity markets, the study therefore 
assumes the use of district and household level factors determining commodity prices 
considering that crop prices during the study period were relatively stable.  
The district and household level factors influence not only the magnitude of transaction costs 
but also farm household‟s marketing capacities and therefore have been used to reflect the role 
of crop prices in determining household cropland allocation decisions in the analysis. The 
statistical significance of the district dummies verifies the importance of accounting for such 
factors in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 Conclusions and recommendations for future research 
This study has investigated three main issues related to how crop-specific subsidies affect 
farm households cropping pattern decisions. First, I have analyzed how fertilizer subsidies 
affect farm households‟ crop diversification levels. Then, I explored how this crop-specific 
subsidy to maize affects farm households‟ cropland allocation to maize, ground nuts, tobacco 
and root-tuber crops (cassava and sweet potato). Finally, I assessed gender and regional 
differences in the farm households‟ crop diversification between the two regions and between 
male and female headed households. 
Treatment effects model and the GLS estimation techniques have been used to analyze the 
effect of fertilizer subsidies on farm households‟ crop choice/cropland allocation patterns and 
crop diversification. I find that farm households‟ cropland allocation patterns and the 
subsequent crop diversification levels are generally sensitive to fertilizer subsidy programs. 
The econometric results strongly reject the first two null hypotheses while being in line with 
the third null hypothesis. These empirical findings suggest that crop-specific fertilizer 
subsidies to maize are associated with 1) an increase the diversity of crops grown; and 2) a 
decrease in the cropland allocated to maize while increasing the cropland allocation for the 
other crops especially ground nuts, tobacco and tubers. These study findings are in line with 
the Malawi Government‟s expected outcomes for the implementation of such a policy 
program (Malawi Government, 2006b).  
Learning from the context of Malawi‟s program of fertilizer subsidy, the study results 
illustrate that fertilizer subsidy can positively contribute to promoting farm households‟ crop 
diversification level through crop intensification in favour of the supported crop, maize. The 
extent to which farm households‟ cropping patterns change in response to economic 
incentives such as fertilizer subsidy, should therefore form part of the analysis of the impact 
of fertilizer subsidies on crop yields. Other factors were also statistically significant in 
influencing cropland allocation to the different crops. This suggests that should also be 
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considered when analyzing the effect of a policy on farm household crop diversification and 
cropping patterns.  
On gender differences, the empirical findings indicate that there are no significant differences 
in crop diversification between male and female headed households. However, in terms of 
cropland allocation, the results show that female headed households are associated with 
allocating more cropland to maize and pulses than to tobacco and roots-tubers crops.  These 
results are not surprising considering that women are said to prefer more food crop cultivation 
than cash crops. On the other hand, the results could suggest that the root-tuber crops could 
also considered new cash crops as women are allocating less cropland to these crops. 
There are significant regional differences in crop diversification. Southern region is associated 
with less crop diversification than the central region.  The lower level of crop diversification 
in the southern region could be explained by the fact that there are fewer households that grow 
more of other cash crops such as tobacco and ground nuts than it is the case in the central 
region. 
On a cautionary note, the interpretation of the results in this study should bear in mind that the 
econometric estimation of the models does not control for crop prices which are also an 
important determinant of cropland allocation decisions and crop diversification. It is expected 
that big changes in prices may significantly affect the study outcomes. Analysis of cropland 
allocation in this study did not extend to crop combinations such as mixed and inter-cropping 
systems due to partial availability of data on crop areas. In practice, many farmers may 
actually combine two or more crops on the same plot. Therefore analysis based on crop 
mixtures and intercropping systems would be much more informative and as such, the 
quantitative results in this study should only be regarded as suggestive and not conclusive. 
As an extension to this empirical analysis, it would therefore be interesting to investigate the 
effect of fertilizer subsidy on maize in a mixed crop setting. Furthermore, changes in cropland 
allocation patterns to various crops will have implications for input resource allocation 
decisions for labour and other crop inputs. It would therefore be interesting to extend this 
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study to the analysis of farm households input resource re-allocation behavior as a response to 
their access to fertilizer subsidy. Simulations can also be done to analyze the extent to which 
one crop displaces the other. Subsequent similar analyses are also encouraged to include crop 
prices. Finally, it would also be worth exploring the relationship between crop intensification 
and productivity, especially of the crops other than maize; and relate the outcomes with the 
farm size-productivity relationship. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
    
Variable Name Mean Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables    
Crop diversification index 0.320 0 0.774 
Maize cropland share 0.592 0 1 
gnut_cropland share 0.103 0 1 
tobacco cropland share 0.069 0 1 
Pulses cropland share 0.055 0 1.875 
Roottuber cropland share 0.058 0 0.968 
    
Explanatory Variables    
Access to fertilizer subsidy 0.617 0 1 
Year 2007.2 2006 2009 
Region 0.573 0 1 
Thyolo District 0.135 0 1 
Zomba  District 0.211 0 1 
Chiradzulu District 0.104 0 1 
Machinga District 0.123 0 1 
Kasungu District 0.230 0 1 
Lilongwe District 0.198 0 1 
Average plot fertility level 1 0.201 0 1 
Average plot fertility level 2 0.520 0 1 
Average plot fertility level 3 0.279 0 1 
Average slope 1 0.689 0 1 
Average slope 2 0.271 0 1 
Average slope 3 0.040 0 1 
Average soil type 1 0.311 0 1 
Average soil type 2 0.497 0 1 
Average soil type 3 0.191 0 1 
Average home to plot distance 
in km 
0.445 0 22.505 
Sex of the head of household 0.257 0 1 
Age of household head 44.511 16 85 
School years of the household 
head 
4.712 0 17 
Male labour 1.612 0 8 
60 
 
 
Female labour 1.380 0 7.7 
Household labour 3.011 0.5 12.1 
Number of children 2.655 0 10 
Consumer –worker ratio 1.290 0.483 3 
Quality of house 8.790 4 16 
Real asset value 8536.647 1.591 311712.4 
Tropical livestock units 1.267 0 23.6 
Number of plots 3.268 0 12 
Home to market distance 17.995 0 400 
Elderly headed household 0.113 0 1 
land -labor ratio 0.441 0.006 4.519 
Land size 1.184 0.015 10 
Note:  All variables have 1102 observations, except for pulses cropland share with 789 
observations and home to plot distance with 1035 observations. 
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Annex 2: Selection Equation Estimates for the Treatment Effect Model 
Independent variable Parameter estimates 
(Selection Equation) 
Standard 
Error 
Elderly headed household -0.020    0.154 
sex of head of household  -0.031 0.119 
Household total land size in hectares 0.016    (0.051)    
Number of children 0.063*   0.038   
Quality of house 0.044**  0.017   
Total household livestock units 0.034    0.032 
Consumer-worker ratio -0.419*   0.241  
year_2007 (dummy) 0.162    0.160  
year_2009 (dummy) 0.470*** 0.163 
Zomba District (dummy) -0.148    (0.186)    
Chiradzulu District (dummy) -0.490**  0.238 
Machinga District (dummy) -0.791*** 0.237 
Kasungu District (dummy) -0.720*** 0.185   
Lilongwe District (dummy) -0.758*** 0.188 
Constant 0.528    0.402 
prob>chi2 0.000   
Wald Chi2 (26) 58.31   
Log peudolikelihood ratio -434.5365   
Number of observations of equations 710   
Estimates are presented as marginal effects at the mean values of the explanatory variables.  
Significant levels (* 10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent). Standard errors are provided in parenthesis 
For the categorical dummy variables, the base categories were automatically dropped. These are: year=2006, 
district=Thyolo,  
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Annex 3: Panel Probit Model Results for the Access to Fertilizer Subsidy 
Independent Variable Parameter estimate 
 b/se    
Quality  of house 0.049*** 
 (0.018)    
Number of children 0.066**  
 (0.034)    
Sex of head of household (1=female) -0.038    
 (0.107)    
Land size in ha 0.013    
 (0.044)    
Consumer worker ratio -0.343    
 (0.233)    
Zomba District -0.185    
 (0.166)    
Chiradzulu District -0.728*** 
 (0.189)    
Machinga District -0.680*** 
 (0.179)    
Kasungu District -0.757*** 
 (0.165)    
Lilongwe District -0.840*** 
 (0.164)    
Year 2007 0.143    
 (0.096)    
Year 2009 0.389*** 
 (0.105)    
Tropical livestock units 0.022    
 (0.021)    
Log of age of household head 0.046    
 (0.165)    
Log age squared 0.014    
 (0.108)    
Constant 0.249    
 (0.668)    
lnsig2u constant     -2.205***            
 (0.678)     
prob>chi2 0.000    
Number of observations 1085 
Significant levels (* 10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent), Standard errors are provided in parenthesis 
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For the categorical dummy variables, the base categories were automatically dropped. These are: year=2006, district=Thyolo, Soil type= soil 
type 1(sandy soil), slope= slope1 (flat), plot fertility= plot fertility level 1(very fertile) 
 
 
Annex 4: GLS model regression results of cropland shares equations for maize, gnut, 
tobacco, root-tubers and pulses 
Independent Variable Maize Gnut tobacco root-tubers pulses    
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Access to fertilizer 
subsidy (1=access) 
-0.104** 0.010 0.036*** 0.046*** -0.025*** 
 (0.051) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)    
Reduced form error 0.081 -0.009 -0.021* -0.050*** 0.034*** 
 (0.049) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)    
Landsize in ha 0.004 -0.001 0.012*** -0.004** 0.004**  
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Tropical livestock units 0.015*** 0.000 0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002**  
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Number of plots -0.084*** 0.002* 0.001 0.020*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
log_market distance 0.019*** -0.002 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.002    
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
School years of head of 
household 
0.005** 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.000    
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Year 2007 -0.052** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.036*** 0.007    
 (0.026) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)    
Year 2009 -0.050 0.006 0.014** 0.021*** 0.000    
 (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)    
Average plot fertility level 
2 
0.013 0.003 -0.016*** 0.001 -0.008**  
 (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Average plot fertility level 
3 
0.016 0.006* -0.024*** -0.001 -0.016*** 
 (0.023) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Average slope 2 0.019 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)    
Average slope 3 -0.068 0.000 0.007 0.038*** -0.032    
 (0.046) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.034)    
Average soil type 2 -0.046*** -0.002 0.029*** -0.004 0.005*   
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Average soil type 3 -0.070*** 0.002 0.034*** -0.034*** -0.002    
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 (0.021) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Zomba District -0.019 0.006 0.066*** 0.005 -0.080*** 
 (0.033) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.026)    
Chiradzulu District 0.028 0.010 0.086*** 0.030*** -0.102*** 
 (0.042) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027)    
Machinga District -0.117** 0.014 0.032*** 0.029** -0.104*** 
 (0.046) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.027)    
Kasungu District -0.184*** 0.183*** 0.095*** 0.054*** -0.082*** 
 (0.044) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027)    
Lilongwe District -0.181*** 0.261*** 0.069*** 0.035*** -0.109*** 
 (0.051) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028)    
Plot distance 0.002 0.000 -0.004*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)    
Log of age of household 
head 
-0.050*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.003 0.005**  
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)    
Log of age squared 0.014 0.001 -0.004 0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)    
Sex of head of household 
(1= female) 
0.085*** 0.002 -0.026*** -0.009** 0.033*** 
 (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)    
Consumer worker ratio -0.059* 0.005 0.026*** 0.012** -0.006    
 (0.034) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)    
Household labour 0.012* 0.000 0.002* -0.010*** 0.002    
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant 1.062*** -0.034 -0.143*** -0.149*** 0.146*** 
 (0.138) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.031)    
prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Number of observations 699.000 699.000 699.000 699.000 399.000    
      
Significant levels (* 10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent), Standard errors are provided in parenthesis 
For the categorical dummy variables, the base categories were automatically dropped. These are: year=2006, district=Thyolo, Soil type= soil 
type 1(sandy soil), slope= slope1 (flat), plot fertility= plot fertility level 1(very fertile) 
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Annex 5: Map of Malawi showing districts and sites sampled in the study 
 
 
Source: Lunduka (2010)
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Annex 6: 2009 Questionnaire for NOMA Household survey 
 
 
